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Abstract
European universities have lost—and partially regained—key research academics to North 
American and other attractive university systems. EU efforts to reverse the cycle revolve 
around the establishment of an attractive European Research Area (ERA), within which future 
academic mobility might be confined with improved policies and reformations.
The mobility of European university academics is analyzed by use of data that result from a 
large web-survey in the first half of 2009 drawn fromsix disciplines (Physics, Biological 
Sciences, Chemical Engineering, Computer Science, Economics and History) in the top 201 
European research universities.  Two mobility models are explored; one considers the factors 
that contribute to an academic’s decision to relocate to another university and the second 
examines whether that relocation would occur within the ERA or elsewhere.  Both models 
draw heavily upon Hirschman’s seminal work that conceives career relocation as an “exit” 
decision, one which can be compared to the principalrationales for remaining (being “loyal” 
or having “voice”) at the same post.  
The mobility model findings strongly support Hirschman’s view of academic relocation, 
whereby academic relocation is often motivated by the relative limitation of voice in 
governance or demonstrated loyalty in terms of long-term engagement at their university.  
The results from logit modeling of choices and options indicate clearly that academics who 
exercise either "loyalty" or "voice" are significantly less likely to be mobile. Moreover, those 
who are mobile refuse to restrict possible destinations to within the ERA if they value better 
material conditions or better quality of colleagues, students or university reputation.  These 
findings have important implications for the governance and resource commitments under 
review by Europe’s leading universities.3
Introduction
The emergence of Europe’s knowledge economy has been slower than expected, taking the 
U.S. as a baseline, particularly in terms of anticipated productivity and economic growth.  But 
knowledgeoutput and its diffusion have also increased more slowly than hoped.  Many 
factors have been advanced as responsible, ranging from the incomplete integration of 
existing and new EU member economies to the ongoing reorganization of traditional regimes 
of higher education throughout Europe.  
This paper examines closely the factors underlying the mobility of highly skilled university 
academics from one post to another.  The focus on academic mobility can be seen froma 
broader perspective that expresses concern for the range of intangible assets that firms, 
industries and regions rely upon to support their continued growth and development.This 
concern has grown in importance as globalization steadily shifts the base of many economies 
away from production of routine, standardized goods and services to more knowledge-
intensive output.  Moreover, the precariously dated knowledge base that recent EU members 
now rely heavily upon is precisely the one they must swiftly replace if their transitions to 
modernity are to be realized.  Since knowledge is seen as the prime prerequisite for upgrading 
of all EU member economies, universities and their faculties can beseen as principal agents 
in its generation and territorial diffusion.
In response to the growing importanceof the knowledge economy in European life, the 
European Commission has pursued development ofthe European Research Area (ERA) since 
2000.  Launched first as part of the Lisbon process to accelerate knowledge transfers
1, the 
ERA was also intended to repatriate or help reduce further losses of Europe’s academics to 
the U.S., particularly its ‘star scientists’ and those who may be more commercially-inclined.  
Beyond the usual brain-loss issues, the ERA was also envisioned as a means of accelerating 
brain-circulation of its “knowledge spillover agents”
2 within the EU and of improving its 
overall research capacity, consistent with knowledge economy requirements.  The ERA could 
be realized by accelerating the training of more scientists and creating an “internal market” 
for research that might retain potentialoutwardly-mobile EU academics or attract expatriates
home.  At the sametime, internal market efforts were to be further enhanced by improving 
coordination among national research and education systems, which account for the bulk of 
research undertaken in Europe.  The EU also directed its attention to revision or enactment of
better S&T policies concerning education (e.g. Bologna process), mobility and research that 
would enhance the prospects for an effective ERA
3.  Together, these actions should stimulate 
greater mobility among additional scientists, while at the same time inducing a virtuous circle 
of competition for research services that would result from efforts to improve research 
opportunities and funding at universities and research centres throughout Europe.
A major review and re-launch of ERA began in 2007 with a comprehensivestudy and 
accompanying Green Paper.  A concluding annex to the study lays out the original 2000 
objectives, actions underway, and barriers encountered in bringing the ERA about.  Building 
on the findings and further insights, the European Research Area Board issued its first report 
                                                  
1 See Bergman (2010) for a review of knowledge and innovation flows from the perspectives of European firms 
and universities.
2 Following a suggestion by Bergman and Schubert (2005) to focus investigations of innovation diffusion on the 
role of knowledge spillover agents, recent papers have explored the specific role of “star scientists” in Europe 
concerning the spread of knowledge to firms and regions (Maier, Kurka and Trippl, 2007; Trippl and Maier, 
2007; Schiller and Diez, 2008).
3 A 2000-2006 timeline & list of EC initiatives related to the ERA is available in EC 2007, p. 17.4
in 2009, which laid a broad basis for what it terms the “New Renaissance” for European 
research.  Under its ‘United ERA’ goal is the Board’s expectation that academic mobility will 
triple by 2030, essentially introducing the 5
th Freedomofknowledge mobility among member 
and affiliated states.  The movement of knowledge is derived from the associated mobility of 
academics (Akers, 2005), which is deemed necessary to develop and diffuse the knowledge 
economy throughout the ERA.  
International mobility (“nomadism”) has always been a feature of scientific fields, although 
the EU would prefer that such mobility occurs with greater frequency within the Union’s ERA
to help stimulate reforms and share knowledge among member states.  The factors responsible 
for present levels of mobility in single countries have been investigated in numerous studies 
during the past two decades and we have learned much recently (Crespi, Geuna and Nesta, 
2005; Constant and DÁgosto, 2008; Zubieta, 2008; Kahn and Ginther, 2008; de Grip, 
Fouarge, and Sauermann, 2009; Kim, Lee and Marschke, 2006; Adams and Clemmons, 
2008), but until now there has been no comprehensive study of academics from representative 
disciplines that now conduct the majority of research in Europe’s top universities.  This paper 
intends to help fill that gap.
Mobility of Academics and Scientists: The Framework
Although academic mobility has long been a topic of investigation in the U.S., Europe’s 
academics and scientific workers have received considerable scrutiny only recently in a series 
of studies, motivated heavily by concerns discussed above and thanks to the increasing 
availability ofsecondary data that permit such inquiries. 
Academic mobility has typically been considered a specialized cohort of migration studies, 
leading studies that rely on tools of standard demography and increasingly on the economic 
factors underlying mobility,using common utility frameworks that imply an ex ante 
evaluation of relative costs and benefits (Borjas, 1994).   As de Grip, et. al. (2009) observe, 
economic self-improvement is asignificant consideration in any career-related move, which 
leads to models that predict utility-based mobility in light ofa variety of individual 
characteristics, particularly those related to human capital and demographic-life cycle 
characteristics.  Economic conditions in the potential host country might also be expected to 
“pull” potential migrants (Harris and Todaro, 1970) from their home country posts, 
particularly if wage growth could also be expected as future returns to mobility (Cheswick, 
1978).
But purely economic rationales are difficult to attribute to academics and scientists as their 
sole or even primary value.  The love of science and inquiry could easily trump pure 
economic returns in many decisions to move.  Indeed, it can be argued persuasively that 
academics have already demonstrated a strong extra-market orientation by the very fact of 
having pursued a more socially-oriented career that is widely known to yield returns inferior 
to those available in private industry for equivalent levels of skill and training.  
The special case of mobility of academics within the ERA adds a furtherdimension: the 
comparative advantage offered by potentialEU host countries and universities on a wide array 
of salary plus other relevant scientific conditions remains quite unstable as improvements
underway concerning academic freedom, research facilities, employment conditions, contract 
obligations (e.g., administration or teaching), university governance, and the like at the home 
institution could alter mobility choices considerably.  Indeed, potentially mobile academics 5
may be involved in bringing such improvements about or at the very least consider 
themselves to have a voice in the beneficial development of their home institution.  
Accordingly, these possibilities also deserve attention in efforts to understand academic 
mobility in contemporary Europe.
We therefore propose to adopt the general framework proposed first by A.O. Hirschman 
(1970) in which the participants ofimperfect institutions decide to remain loyal to them, 
attempt to change them from within by exercising voice in governance, or decide to exit.  This 
framework has been used many times to study employment and career-related issues, often 
prompted by labour-management disputes, but increasingly with an eye toward mobility of 
skilled employees (Withey and Cooper, 1989; Graham and Keeley, 1992; Jablin, 1992; 
Luchak, 2003; Pfister, 2006; Mir, Mir and Bapuji, 2007; Hoffmann, 2008).  Unlike many 
articles that adopt this framework to explore logical consequences of Hirschman’s seminal 
insights, we intend to model theexit mobility decision of European academics as the function 
of several specific human capital, demographic, and institutional factors that arise within 
universities, including other“Hirschman” variables that explicitly measure voice in 
governance and evidence of loyalty.  We fully expect theseHirschman variables to be 
significant and negative (hypothesizing both are substitutes for exit), but the reason for their
inclusion, whether significant or not, and value-added lies in accounting for thesepotentially 
important influences.  The remaining effects exerted by other variables thereby gain 
importance and reliability.  
This paper relies upon a recent survey that collected the data necessary to introduce 
Hirschman and othervariables, which will be described in the following section.  It will be 
followed by a discussion of the variables selected from a broader literatureof academic and 
scientistmobility and their use in the modelling exercises.  A logit model is estimated that 
accounts for the likelihood of future exit, given satisfactory conditions might be gained in the 
new location.  Those who indicate a willingness to be mobile also specify the numberof 
possible continentaldestinations, selecting as wellthe most important conditions to be met, 
which are summarized first descriptively and then analyzed further by use of a multi-nomial 
logit model.  The multi-nomial model estimates the relative likelihood of preferring specific 
Hirschman-type alternatives—the dependent variable—that are destination combinations
comprised of: only European destinations (ERA loyalty), only non-European destinations 
(ERA exit), or indifferent to combined EU-other continent combinations (mixed choice as the 
reference case)
4.  The paper concludes with a discussion of findings and implications for 
research and policy.
Data
The data used in this paper result from a large web-survey of European academics in the first 
half of 2009.  The survey was designed to collect information about the academic and 
institutional characteristics of university professors and researchers holding posts in the top 
500 research universities located in Europe, as ranked in the “Shanghai” index
5.  This ranking 
was used as a familiar metric, in part because it focuses heavily on the “hard” sciences and 
                                                  
4 The sequence of questions and responses that provide the dependent variables modelled in this paper are 
illustrated in Appendix I.
5 The index also provides a bridge between the EU universities investigated here and the U.S. universities 
surveyed in the Goldstein (2009) study, thereby permitting a companion investigation of comparative faculty
attitudes toward commercialization in the research universities of the two continents (Bergman, Goldstein, and 
Maier, 2011). 6
their role in the knowledge economy. Using this criterion, our sampling frame consisted of 
201 European universities.
The universities included in the survey are found in 19 countries, 201 of which are Shanghai-
ranked, with 14 additional, lower-ranked universities added from Austria and Switzerland to 
help understand possible differences between the Shanghai-ranked and unranked groups.   
Within the overall university sampling-frame, we further stratified the sample of academics 
by discipline, choosing 6 that overlapped Goldstein’s groups (2009) from each university’s 
webpage
6: Physics, Biological Sciences, Chemical Engineering, Computer Science, 
Economics and History.  Three respondents were drawn from each disciplinary unit present in 
all sampled universities’ web-pages, where the director or chair was included when 
identification was possible, plus two (or three) other randomly selected respondents.  This 
yielded a total of 9,393 invitations to participate in the survey, which were sent as an e-mailed 
letter of invitation that introduced the survey’s purpose and supplied a unique log-in code to 
secure the file from uninvited or multiple respondents. Excluding all invalid e-mail addresses 
and respondents who replied to say that they refused to participate, our survey included a final 
number of 8826 valid contacts.  Respondents could choose to answer survey questions in any 
of the 5 most widely-used European languages:  English, French, German, Italian and 
Spanish.  Of those valid contacts, 1798 filled out the full questionnaire, yielding a 20% 
response rate.  Response rates to other surveys of mobility among European academics range 
as low as 12-16%, and indeed UK and Spanish respondents fell within that bracket, although 
Polish and Italian academics responded at twice these rates (30-33%). Response rates differed 
little across disciplines
7 (2-3 percentage points around the mean).
A few respondent characteristics will be summarized to give an overall impression, while 
further discussion of specific characteristics will be provided in later sections concerning the 
definition of variables.   Males dominate these academic fields (82%), as do those teaching in 
departments that include PhD students (92%), and those on permanent contracts (69%).  The 
median tenure of current posts is 9years; 1996 is the median year (“degree vintage”) in which 
the terminal degree was granted.  Concerning traditional academic duties, 10% had no peer-
reviewed publications
8 in the preceding 2 years (26% had 10 or more); 10% taught no courses 
in the same period, while 10% taught 10 or more classes.   The so-called “Third Mission” of 
social engagement by universities can be found in the 61% who engaged in uncompensated 
forms of public service (e.g., public lectures or advice) and by the 70% who have attempted to 
commercialize some academic skill, finding or discovery in the market.   
                                                  
6 French universities presented a problem: their web-pages do not list their academic faculty members and 
researchers by discipline, nor do their web-pages supply e-mail addresses necessary to conduct a web-survey.  
As an alternative, we searched the ISI Web of Science to locate and then select academics at a given French 
university who had previously published in journals of a given discipline.  Author data provided on the 
publications listed in the Web of Science sometimes included e-mail addresses or further information that 
permitted additional on-line search to obtain usable e-mail addresses.  A subsequent survey of Finnish 
commercialisation efforts followed a similar procedure (Tahvanainen and Nikulainen, 2011)
7
An imbalance in respondents by discipline results directly from sampling anomalies: Chemical Engineering is 
sparsely distributed in the overall sample and among respondents (4%), while Physics (28%) and Biological 
Sciences (25%) are profusely and diversely represented in nearly all Shanghai-ranked universities, sometimes in 
multiple academic units at the same university.  On the other hand, academic units of Computer Science (18%), 
Economics (13%) and History (12%) are more evenly distributed across universities and among our respondents.  
8 Taking responses to this question as a rough measure of academic productivity, an exploratory ordered-logit 
model (not shown here) indicates clearly that among sample respondents, previous mobility in other institutions 
or countries exerts a strong and positive influence on academic productivity, which corresponds to recent 
fi ndings of Kim, Lee and Marschke (2006).  The productivity benefits sought through various EC and other 
European measures to stimulate mobility appear to be well-founded, offering further support for this effort to 
understand better the factors that underlay such mobility.7
About 70% of respondents have had at least 6 months of career mobility following receipt of 
their terminal degree and before taking their current post.With respect to endogamy, about 
39% in current posts also received their degree from the same university.  A full 75% indicate 
they would be willing to accept a new post in another European or world region, assuming 
certain conditions were met.  Why and where such mobility is likely to occur is of course the 
subject of this paper.
Mobility Model and Variables
9
Consistent with our overall analytic framework, the dependent variable for mobility is
labelled Exit, the first of severalHirschman-inspired variables that apply well to academics.  
It results from a yes or no answer to the following question: 
“Would you accept a university post in a different region, assuming improved 
conditions?”
10
The question implies the comparison of an unspecified but improved future opportunity for 
university work elsewhere to accepting the status quo ante of the present post.  Following 
Hirschman, one should logically expect the probability of answering yes to mobility to be 
inversely related to answers that indicate loyalty to or voice in the post.  A standard logit 
model will be used to model responses in light of several relevant independent variables.  
A rich selection of independent variables is also available from the survey and secondary 
sources, the first of which is Voice:an independent variable that is directly measured by 
survey responses to this question: 
“In determining the policies and governance of your university concerning expanded 
public-private partnerships (e.g., “university-industry” links), please specify the 
influence exerted by university academic staff”.
Severalother questions in thesurvey deal with issues of commercialisation and respondents 
had already given it considerable attention, so it offers a clearly specified policy area with 
which to measure the voice of academics.  The formulation of Voice was taken froma 
previous study of European university governance
11 based on the responses of university 
administrators, which permits its use as an externaland useful benchmark (CHEPS, 2006).  
Academics in the present survey consider themselves to have 1. no influence (9%), 2. some 
influence (45%) or 3. much influence (31%) on this policy, while CHEPS administrators
consider the same degrees of influence exercised by academics respectively as 1. 8%, 2. 64%, 
and 3. 20%
12.   The imbalance of responses shows a higher percentage academics consider 
themselves to have “much” greater influence than fewer university leaders would agreethey 
do.  The opposite assessment is even more dramatic:  while university leaders (CHEPS) 
consider their influence to be: 1. none (1%), 2. some (22%), and 3. much (72%),  academics 
                                                  
9 The complete set of dependent and independent variables used in the two models reported here can be found in 
Appendix II.  All but six are dichotomously measured: ClassLoad and PeerRPubs are ordinal, while Tenure and 
Vintage are continuously scaled measures. 
10 We focus exclusively on prospective inter-university mobility, not ex post mobility or mobility to other 
research positions (public research centres, industry R&D, etc.), non-university administrative posts, or to self-
employed/entrepreneurial positions.  Of  the 1708 academics who responded to this question, 75.4% indicated 
potential mobility to another university.  
11 In this study (CHEPS, 2006), university administrators were the principal respondents.  In addition to the 
influence of university academic staff, answers to the same questions were also collected concerning the relative 
influence of Ministries of Higher Education, University Leadership, Business and Industry Leaders, and 
Regional Authorities.  More basic questions about university governance and autonomy, which many consider of 
greater importance, have been raised by Aghion, Dewatripont, Hoxby, Mas-Colell and Sapir (2009).
12 Respondents could also select “Not Relevant or Don’t Know”, which were recoded as missing values in this 
frequency distribution, represent the remaining percentages. 8
reduce their assessment of the influence of their university leaders on this matter as 1. 1%, 2. 
39%, and 3. 35%.  There is clearly some potential tension between university leaders and 
academic staff concerning their respective roles in university governance, which may be 
expected to spill over into decisions concerning academic mobility. We intend to capture and 
test for the effects of this tension by also coding the academics’ view of the importance of 
administrators (ProvostVoice) in setting university commercialisation policies.  All else equal, 
stronger administrator voices in governance matters may increase the possibilities of 
academic mobility.
Measuring loyalty can be done in several ways, which we do indirectly to minimize the 
potential for strategic responses, where the measures are based on routine academic 
benchmarks.   The first (UniEndog) is a measure of endogamy, which is determined by 
whether the respondent indicates the terminal degree was (or not) earned at the same 
university as the present post, sincestaying at or returning to one’s alma mater captures a 
clear dimension of loyalty.  Anotherobvious dimension of loyalty is measured by whether 
one holds an unlimited or time-limited Contract in the present post.  A third is measured by 
the length of time (Tenure) spent in the present post, which indicates aspects of both intertie 
and previous loyalty.  A final dimension is the Vintageof one’s terminal degree (and a rough 
proxy of respondent age); the older the degreeand its depreciable basis, the less easily one 
may find or even be willing to entertain other opportunities, i.e., a form of involuntary loyalty.  
There is some collinearity among these alternatives, so selection will be necessary.
Despite recent advances, mobility is conventionally thought to be more willingly undertaken 
by men than women, due to an enabling mix of elements that involve domestic circumstances, 
career-orientation, relative gains from mobility, and risk-taking (Kahn and Ginther, 2008; 
Constant and DÁgosto, 2008).  We therefore assume that Gender (0/1 male) increases the 
probability of exit mobility.  The academic practices of respondents could also affect mobility 
decisions, e.g. thesystematicuse of research funds to produce scientific publications (SciPub) 
or working in an academic department in which PhD students are studying (PhdProg) may 
also reveal strong research interests and thereby promote mobility.   The reasoning is 
generally the same: scientific prowess and focus are internationally signalled anduniversally 
recognized qualities among other potential science-oriented destinations, thereby expanding 
mobility possibilities.  Finally, following Constant and DÀgosto (2008) and Crespi, Geuna, 
and Nesta (2005), we expect academics with post-degree mobility (PostDegMob) more likely 
to be mobile in the future.  To repeat, we hypothesize positive and significant signs for these 
variables.
Academic activities may also tend to anchor respondents in their current post, particularly if 
activities produce valued contacts with non-academics that could be difficult to replicate in 
another country.  In such circumstances, academics might be less likely to exit their post for 
another.  More specifically, the academic contacts made with collaborative industry 
colleagues (CollabProj), the sponsors from whom funds were received to prepare client or 
policy reports (PolicyPub), or the actions with external others necessary to commercialise 
one’s academic discoveries and talents (Commerce) all measure tangible connections with 
local businesses, industry or government.  In addition to the loss of networks valued for their 
own sake, there may also be adverse pecuniary consequences as well.  
Productivity in conventional academic terms may also have a bearing on willingness to exit.  
Highly published academics are usually visible to other universities eager to enhance their 
scholarly profiles and mightthereforebecome the intended object of recruitment efforts.  If 
so, the number of peer-reviewed publications (PeerRevPubs) claimed by respondents could be 9
expected to increase their exit possibilities.  Crespi, Geuna and Nesta (2005) show the 
chances for mobility of European academics are higher for those with more peer-reviewed 
publications (PeerRPubs), as do Kahn and Gunther (2008) for U.S.  Very different reasoning 
is involved with instructional productivity, as high average number of classes taught 
(ClassLoad) is unlikely to attract attention of other universities;however, respondents with 
heavy class obligations may consider exit as a means of escaping the burden teaching 
pressures. Academics may feel pushed fromhome institutions by anobligation to teach 
relatively heavy course loads, and thereby hopeto escape some of the burden (or even lack of 
appreciation) by relocation to another more favourable institution.
13  Finally, academics who 
become actively engaged in their communities (PubSvs)as part of their university’s “Third 
Mission” obligations, are often in an excellent position to develop valued relationships not 
easily or casually broken.  On the other hand, these academics are far more exposed to other 
sectors, organisations and ideas; consequently, they may be more willing to consider new 
possibilities, including a new post elsewhere.  Our expectation is therefore uncertain for 
PubSvs; it could positively or negatively affect exit probabilities.
Factors peculiar to academics are of considerable interest in this model, including those that 
characterise the respondent and the respondents’ relation to the university.  One group 
consists of dummy variables for each of the disciplines to which the respondent belongs, 
which distinguish between the so-called “pure” and “applied” sciences, and between them and 
the “social” sciences.  Accordingly, Physics, Biology, ComputerSci, History and Economics
will be compared with base-case of chemical engineering (ChemEng).  There is no prior 
evidence of disciplinary differences in mobility among academics from which hypotheses 
might be drawn, although the more institutionally- and culturally-specific social science
academics might be somewhat less mobile than the hard sciences.  These may serve most 
usefully as control variables.  A second group of dummies (country names) indicate the 
national university system of which respondents are members and from which they might (or 
not) be interested in exiting.  Again, these may serve best as control variables, wherethe 
relative national wealth and resources devoted to university systems may provide an 
institutional background for academic mobility decisions.
Modelling Mobility Among European Academics
We parse the independent variables into groups that represent important conceptual ensembles 
for logit modelling, before considering their entry in an aggregate model.  Panel A. of Table 1 
examines the Hirschman variables, which are of greatest theoretical interest.  They do not 
disappoint in either sign or significance.  Two highly significant variables, Vintage and 
Tenure, show that long-loyal academics are much less likely to exit their university posts in 
search of another.  The voice variables are also compelling and reinforcing: academics that 
consider their own voices important in governance issues aresignificantly more likely to 
remain, but those who think administrators have powerful voices—presumably at the cost of 
their own—are more likely to exit.
The next group of variables tested in Panel B. cover a broad range academic activities and 
relationships that might affect mobility decisions.  Somewhat surprisingly, very littleof what 
                                                  
13“In research universities, teaching load is also important. It's quasi-impossible to both do cutting-edge research 
and be an excellent teacher when the teaching load of a professor is close to 200 hours per year”, from interview 
“Innovative universities must attract top researchers” with Professor Jean-Claude Latombe, EurActiv, 9 April 
2009; http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/latombe-innovative-universities-attract-top-researchers/article-
181199.10
or how much academics actually do in present posts appear to affect their future mobility, i.e. 
the model fit is insignificant overall.  
Table 1.  Mobility Model
Panels of Variable Groups
A B C D E
Coeff   P>|z| Coef P>|z|
     
Coef P>|z|   Coef P>|z|         Coef        P>|z|
Tenure -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00
Vintage -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.00
Voice -0.30 0.02 -0.34 0.02
ProvostVoice 0.24 0.08 0.35 0.02
PostDegMob 0.22 0.09 0.30 0.05
ClassLoad 0.01 0.86 0.09 0.17
PeerRevPubs 0.03 0.61 0.02 0.76
Gender 0.22 0.14 0.45 0.01
CollabProj 0.09 0.51 -0.12 0.41
Commerce 0.01 0.91 0.13 0.39
PubSvs 0.06 0.62 0.21 0.14
SciPubs -0.1 0.44 -0.13 0.45
PolPubs 0.09 0.48 0.02 0.88
Physics 0.15 0.64 -0.41 0.26
History 0.04 0.91 -0.22 0.60
Economics 0.40 0.23 -0.66 0.09
CompSci 0.08 0.80 -0.51 0.17
Biology 0.16 0.62 -0.45 0.23
UnitedKing~m 1.01 0.00 1.14 0.00
Switzerland 1.42 0.00 1.44 0.00
Sweden 1.19 0.01 1.26 0.01
Spain -0.23 0.56 0.16 0.71
Portugal 0.04 0.95 0.24 0.73
Poland -0.02 0.97 0.66 0.25
Netherlands 1.26 0.00 1.15 0.00
Italy 0.63 0.07 0.70 0.07
Ireland 0.58 0.27 0.35 0.54
Hungary -0.56 0.27 -0.41 0.47
Greece 0.04 0.95 0.30 0.67
Germany 1.72 0.00 1.64 0.00
France 1.35 0.00 1.49 0.00
Denmark 0.20 0.58 0.05 0.91
Belgium 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.36
Austria 0.93 0.01 1.19 0.00
CONSTANT 32.95 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.27 0.00 0.12 0.68 71.94 0.00
# obs 1619 1670 1708 1708.00 1606.00
LR chi2 125.8 7 4.6 117.70 226.40
Prob > chi2 0 0.63 0.47 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.7 0 0 0.06 0.13
Those who were previously mobile are somewhat likelier to continue, but the other variables 
and the overall model remain convincingly insignificant.11
Looking next at the control variables, none of the disciplines—taken as a group—show 
significant effects (Panel C.).  Several national university system controls do, however, have 
significant effects (Panel D.).
14
The full model results (Panel E) continue to reveal strong support for the presence of 
“Hirschman Effects” in academic mobility decisions.  Loyalty variables remain highly 
significant, while both academic and administrator voice variables gain significance.  One 
must necessarily conclude that academics with stable career histories and shorter career 
prospects are quite likely to remain immobile in the future.  At the same time, academics who 
claim to exercise voice to influence local university governance issues are also unlikely to 
consider future mobility, due perhaps to the satisfactions expected from its exercise.  When 
academic voice in governance matters is threatened by strong administrator voice, exit 
probabilities rise significantly. These are preciselythe results one shouldexpect if 
respondents behave as Hirschman hypothesized.  
Respondents who were previously mobile or who are male are shown here as significantly 
more likely to exit their present posts.  The national controls are unchanged in this aggregate 
model, although economists in this model tend to be less mobile than others, albeit only at 
marginal significance levels.
Mobile Academics: Conditions and Destination Selectivity
Respondents who indicated an interest in mobility were identified and queried furtherabout 1)
conditions sought in an alternate destination and 2) which destinations—Australia, Asia, 
Europe, North America, and South America—were preferred.  Any combination of 
destinations could be selected, with the total for any respondent ranging between 1 and 5 
locations
15.  Those selecting only one destination region appear to be highly selective, they 
are fully one-third of all who are mobile, and an EU destination is preferred by most of those 
selecting a single-destination.  Another quarter selected only two potential destinations.  In 
both cases, the respondents may be open only to clear improvements in their situations and 
they may also havegood knowledge of options and circumstances at those destinations.  On 
the contrary, those selecting 4 or 5 destinations appear quite indiscriminate and are open to 
many alternatives to their present post.  Graphic 1summarizes various combinations of 
numbers of destinations sought with the conditions sought in all destinations.  
A typicalprofile of conditions most highly sought is clearly evident: better research 
opportunities, higher salaries and promotions are most frequently-soughtconditions
16, while 
less publishing pressure, better social benefits and more contacts with firms and other 
organisations are least frequently mentioned and presumably least important conditions.  The 
most frequently mentioned conditions are wholly logical and well-documented in the 
                                                  
14 Austrian, British, Dutch, French, German, Swedish and Swiss universities to be more mobile, while Italian 
university academics alone are less likely to be mobile.
15 When willingly-mobile respondents (n=1237) are order-logit modelled by the number of destinations (1 to 5)
they would consider, only Vintage and PubSvs of the original independent variables from the mobility model 
retain their significance and original signs (not shown here).  Additional variables that affect the number of  
destinations considered by mobile academics also proved significant: French and ESL (English as second 
language) as their selected questionnaire language, plus the importance of social benefits and the presence of 
stronger students in the new location.  Academics in History or Economics disciplines would tend to consider a 
reduced number of alternative destinations, perhaps reflecting a relative paucity of viable alternative 
destinations.
16 Respondents could select the three most important from a list of 14 condition improvements.12
literature; moreover, these are among the conditions many national systems of higher 
education are now considering to staunch the loss of valued academics who might seriously
Graphic 1.  Is the number of potential exit destinations 

































































































































































































































































consider an exit option.  Other options high on the EU’s list of desiderata appear in our data to 
be far less important than once thought, particularly health and pension benefits, and language 
preference.  Despite the protestations of academics concerning rising publishing pressures in 
the new competitive environment of rankings and faculty recruitment wars, this is the least 
important consideration to anyone considering exit.  A tolerance for higher publication 
expectations could indicate a latent capacity for more research output from university 
academics, given suitable incentives and policy adjustments within universities.  
The preferred conditions can be subdivided into two categories that increasingly autonomous 
universities might act upon through resource reallocation/generation (research opportunities, 
higher salaries, promotion, lessened teaching load)  or altered governance (reduced 
administration, modified working conditions, stronger faculty and student selection, higher 
rank/prestige university, less publication pressure), plus a purely in situ category that offers 
intrinsic advantages of a country or region (family/self QOL, preferred language, contact with 
firms, social benefits).
European Research Area Mobility: Stay or Leave?
The descriptive summary provided in the previous section offers good insight into the overall 
conditions sought by mobile academics and some indication of their selectivity, i.e. one or all 
possible destinations.  Missing is an understanding of which destinations are important and 
why.  We therefore code all possible destination combinations into three mutually exclusive 
categories
17, which consequently permit theuse of a multi-nomial logit model.  Respondents 
who selected only an ERA destination (n=512) can be considered in Hirschman terms to be 
                                                  
17 Twenty-seven unique destination combinations were selected by respondents, which were reduced to three that 
permit our model to focus on the ERA. For details, see Appendix I.13
loyal to the European Research Area, even if not to their present university, as they would
move from their home post but stay within Europe.  Expanding this group is an explicit goal 
of ERA measures. The second much smaller group consists ofthose respondents whose 
selections excluded any ERA destination (n=54), about half of whom prefer North America 
only.  A third group consists of respondents who included Europe plus one or more otherof 4
possible destinations (n=714), where North America accounts for 90% of the other possible 
destinations.  The third group, which is apparently indifferent to an ERA destination, forms 
the large reference case from which the ERA-only or non-ERA groups can be shown to differ
in their responses to the independent variables.  It also includes a varietyof other destinations 
in various mixtures that resemble the palette of choices typically considered by “nomadic” 
scientists and academics who circulate widely and are actively recruited. 
The technical interpretation of multinomialmodels can be abit complicated, as the 
coefficients indicate relatively greater or lesser influenceof the variables on our alternative
destination categories (ERA-only or non-ERA) rather than choosing “ERA-indifferent” 
destinations, which serves as the reference case in our model.  The results are expressed in 
“relative risk ratios” (rrr), whose values indicate whether either alternative has a relatively 
higher (>1) or lower (<1) probability of responding to a unit change of a given variablethan 
the reference case (mixed destinations).  A ratio of equal probabilities would be 1.0 (and 
insignificant); a ratio > 1.0 (and significant) indicates relatively how much more the 
alternative (A or B) is affected by a unit change of a variable than the reference case, and the 
opposite applies for ratios <1.0.  We focus our interpretation on the values of those variables 
with significant probabilities (shaded as per values of column P> | z |) for each alternative in 
Table 2.
             Table 2  Mobility Destination Model
   Panel A          Panel B
rrr P>|z|  rrr P>|z| 
Tenure 1.045 0.043 0.996 0.648
Vintage 0.992 0.730 1.011 0.261
Voice 0.744 0.443 1.379 0.023
ProvostVoice 0.687 0.287 0.786 0.107
PostDegMob 1.442 0.387 0.936 0.667
ClassLoad 0.924 0.631 1.070 0.314
PeerRevPubs 1.148 0.414 1.031 0.642
Gender 0.750 0.524 1.060 0.743
CollabProj 0.919 0.821 0.802 0.142
Commerce 1.104 0.779 0.979 0.887
PubSvs 0.841 0.635 0.844 0.250
SciPubs 1.992 0.235 0.826 0.259
PolPubs 0.854 0.657 0.876 0.355
Physics 1.063 0.940 0.657 0.225
History 0.754 0.766 0.375 0.013
Economics 0.671 0.674 0.568 0.137
CompSci 0.908 0.906 0.429 0.017
Biology 0.558 0.484 0.425 0.015
LessAdmin 1.353 0.512 0.870 0.509
Benefits 1.119 0.863 0.653 0.163
QOW 0.947 0.906 0.982 0.929
FamilyQOL 0.885 0.783 0.815 0.270
Firms/Orgs 0.600 0.469 0.652 0.13714
PubPress 0.429 0.440 0.836 0.605
Promotion 0.513 0.204 0.849 0.427
Colleagues 0.601 0.306 0.564 0.005
Language 0.000 0.984 0.714 0.220
Ropportunity 1.208 0.645 0.647 0.015
Prestige 0.933 0.884 0.538 0.004
TeachLess 0.557 0.304 0.688 0.107
Salary 0.507 0.127 0.592 0.005
Students 0.465 0.163 0.585 0.016
UnitedKing~m 0.435 0.493 0.428 0.067
Switzerland 0.532 0.632 0.649 0.368
Sweden 0.000 0.992 0.582 0.331
Spain 0.945 0.971 1.454 0.534
Portugal 0.000 0.997 0.977 0.982
Poland 0.000 0.996 1.646 0.530
Netherlands 1.598 0.693 1.032 0.946
Italy 1.016 0.990 1.202 0.712
Ireland 0.000 0.995 0.785 0.738
Hungary 0.000 0.996 2.713 0.234
Greece 15.343 0.097 0.954 0.967
Germany 1.534 0.702 0.924 0.856
France 1.199 0.880 0.468 0.119
Denmark 0.000 0.991 0.687 0.495
Belgium 0.000 0.993 1.507 0.460
Austria 2.645 0.415 1.103 0.843
# obs   1204
LR chi2 166.23
Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.084
The results of the model arearranged on two panels in Table 2, each of which represents one 
of the destination categories that is alternative to the mixed-destination referencecase.  Panel 
A presents results for the non-ERA alternative and Panel B the ERA-only destination.  Three 
of the fivesignificant variable groups from the mobility model are repeated here:  Hirschman 
variables, national university systems
18, and academic disciplines.  In addition, all possible 
preferred conditions are included as the means of identifying why respondents are seeking as 
they choose among the three alternative destination groupings. Without exception, variables 
that are significant in one panel arecharacteristically insignificant in the other, i.e. the 
alternative destinations generally reflect the exclusive influence of different variables.  
Starting with Panel A, there is little to distinguish Non-ERA from mixed destinations: only 
the significant instances ofmobile academics with long tenure of service in present post who
appear slightly more likely to avoid the ERA (rrr=1.04) or Greek academics, who massively 
prefer (rrr=16.7) non-ERA destinations.  
The principal findings result from ERA-only and mixed destination comparisons in Panel B.
Here, three of the disciplinary controls for History, Computer Science and Biology exert 
                                                  
18 A few collinear national system variables were omitted, which resulted in the reduced set of country variables.  15
significant effects (rrr=.495 to .843), all of which indicate disciplinary preferences for 
mixed—not ERA-only—destinations, as do respondents fromUnited Kingdomuniversities. 
As mentioned in Panel A., Tenure—one of the Hirschman variables—among mobile 
respondents appears to improve chances of exiting the ERA, while in the mobility model 
Tenure reduced the overall chances of mobility.  Two other Hirschman variables—Voice and 
ProvostVoice—affect the chances of selecting ERA destinations
19only, each again acting in 
opposite directions: mobile academics who claim governance Voice are 37% more likely to 
remain loyal to the ERA, while the marginally significant rrr for a strong administrator voice 
(ProvostVoice) suggests it might compel mobile respondents to consider a much broader 
range of destinations beyond and including ERA (.786).
The remaining significant variables represent the effects of conditions sought through exit on 
the choice between ERA-only and mixed destinations.  Conditions sought by respondents who 
essentially refuse to confinethemselves to ERA-only destinations fall cleanly into one of the 
earlier-established policy categories: those for which the remedy requires 1. resource 
reallocation/generation (higher salaries, improved research opportunities and possibly reduced 
teaching loads) or 2. altered governance solutions (improved selection of students and 
colleagues, higher prestige).  Mixed destinations are preferred to ERA-only (rrr=.428 to .689) 
by respondents for whom these conditions are important, perhaps as a consequence of
competitive recruitment practices among contending universities, which may imply ERA 
universities should be focusing on improving some or all of these conditions to retain mobile 
academics. 
We suggest there is much to consider here for attentive EU policymakers, national ministries 
of higher education and university administrators, particularly if their intent is to retain 
Europe's academics within thehome institution or within the ERA, so as to reap the benefits 
of knowledge flows within Europe. Perhaps one can discount somewhat the conditions 
sought by comparatively few academics who seek to avoid Europe (under 5%of all mobile 
academics), because their share is proportionately small.
Of far greater importance arethe several conditions
20 that reduce EU-only destination 
preferences, which are rather worrying, yet the findings offer clear opportunities for redress.
These are conditions where improvement is possible and where obstacles to ERA success are 
clearly visible. Salaries in many university systems lag behind alternative opportunities
outside academia, particularly forspecific individuals and disciplines in the greatest demand 
around the world. The same is true for research opportunities, although some progress has 
obviously taken place.We note also the relative distaste for ERA-only destinations among 
respondents who seek stronger colleagues and students or a post in more prestigious 
universities. This issue challenges typicalpolicies that promoteunselective mass education 
within research universities and it focuses attention on the importance of university 
governance committed to excellence in the academic enterprise.  This in turn raises the 
question of better meritocratic selection of established academics and aspiring scholars and 
efforts to improve the scientific and scholarly profile of universities.  
                                                  
19 ERA-only destinations are themselves a form of European Loyalty.
20 We have also learned what is relatively unimportant in retaining academics within the ERA: 1. reduced 
administrative burdens, 2. better working conditions, 3. improved quality of life for family, and 4. career 
promotion.  These are clearly important conditions for all destinations, but differences among them do not 
appear to affect choice of destination alternatives. Destination choices are also unaffected by: 1. language 
preferences, 2. less publication pressure, 3. better firm and organization contacts, and 4. better social benefits, 
which are all far less important everywhere and might therefore be safely ignored while focusing policy attention 
on the more important conditions.16
Conclusions
Academic mobility between universities and with respect to European circulation follows 
closely the core ideas about exit from organizations that were advanced 50 years earlier by 
Hirschman. The voice and loyalty variables most closely associated with Hirschman's view 
of the exit option perform as expected and are the most significant, and other variables 
descriptive of mobility conditions also perform well. University administrators will want to 
review policies that give voice to academics, as well as those that instilinstitutionalloyalty, 
while reviewing the importance of moderating their own voice in the interests of retaining or 
attracting academic excellence.
It is entirely possible that several additional policies will need to be revised somewhat for 
universities to retain their best scholars, while at the same time providingan appealing 
destination to potentially mobile academics thesesame universities are trying to attract.
University officials now have a better idea of which conditions are most appealing to mobile 
academics and what could be done to take better advantage of potential intra-ERA mobility.
At the broader level, EU officials should also pay close attention to the conditions that reveal 
a willingness of mobile academics to exit or remain in the ERA.  Some of these may call for 
revised policies at EU level or improved policy coordination with member states.  On the 
other hand, several policies being entertained or pursued are shown to be irrelevant to 
academic retention and may safely be abandoned.17
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APPENDIX I
• 0 519 0 0 0 0 0 519 
• 1 0 0 0 480 0 0 480 
• 10 0 0 0 0 22 0 22 
• 11 0 0 0 0 297 0 297 
• 100 0 0 42 0 0 0 42 
• 101 0 0 0 49 0 0 49 
• 110 0 0 0 0 8 0 8 
• 111 0 0 0 0 165 0 165 
• 1000 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
• 1001 0 0 0 12 0 0 12 
• 1010 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
• 1011 0 0 0 0 24 0 24 
• 1101 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 
• 1110 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
• 1111 0 0 0 0 39 0 39 
• 10000 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
• 10001 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 
• 10010 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
• 10011 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 
• 10100 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
• 10101 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
• 10110 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
• 10111 0 0 0 0 0 14 14 
• 11001 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
• 11010 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
• 11011 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 
• 11101 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 






   Combinations NO-EU   Mixed-EU   EU-ONLY Total
1 0 0 512 512
10 26 0 0 26
11 0 312 0 312
100 6 0 0 6
101 0 35 0 35
110 7 0 0 7
111 0 165 0 165
1000 5 0 0 5
1001 0 12 0 12
1010 3 0 0 3
1011 0 25 0 25
1101 0 7 0 7
1110 2 0 0 2
1111 0 39 0 39
10000 3 0 0 3
10001 0 11 0 11
10010 1 0 0 1
10011 0 13 0 13
10101 0 5 0 5
10111 0 14 0 14
11001 0 1 0 1
11010 1 0 0 1
11011 0 7 0 7
11101 0 2 0 2
11111 0 66 0 66
“Would you accept 
a university post in 





Fewer obligations in administration or committees
Improves opportunities to work with firms or research organizations
Better living situation for me/ my familiy
Greater opportunities for pursuing my research
Equivalent or better pension and/or health benefits available
More intellectually engaged/ better trained student body
Stronger faculty colleagues and networks in my discipline
Less pressure for research and publication
Fewer teaching and instructional obligations
More prestigious university or institute
Ability to work in language(s) I know
Better working conditions
Promotion to a higher or permanent university position
Significant increase in salary
„Important career or living improvements that 
would support the favorable consideration of a 
post in a new region are“ (select 3 most important)
“Assuming certain 
improvements in important 
career or living conditions 































whose values are 
then reduced to the 
3 EU-relative 
categories as per  
column headings 
and Venn diagram 
above.20
APPENDIX II





Model 1 Mobile 
Academics
Would consider accepting a post at another 








Destination Categories of  Mobile 
Academics: No-EU=1 (54), Mixed EU=2 
(714), EU-only (512)=3
NA NA
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Non-compensated service to external 







Sponsored monographs, reports or 







Peer-reviewed publications generated 







Taken actions to commercialise academic 







Present post in same country as university 







Client or policy reports generated 
































































































































































































































*(1=0, 2=1-2, 3=3-5, 4=6-10, 5=>10)                             ~(1=totally agree…5=totally disagree)